1,519 research outputs found

    Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation

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    We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently, but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsidercontrolled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider, adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria.

    Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence

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    We model experimentally the governance of an institution. The optimal management of this institution depends on the information possessed by insiders. However, insiders, whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the institution, may choose to use their information to further personal rather than institutional ends. Researchers (e.g., Palfrey 1990) and the business press have both argued that multiagent mechanisms, which inject trustworthy but uninformed “watchdog” agents into the governance process and impose penalties for conflicting recommendations, can implement institutionally preferred outcomes. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. In the experimental treatments in which watchdog agents were included, the intuitionally preferred allocation was implemented in the vast majority of cases. Surprisingly, implementation occurred even in the absence of penalties for conflicting recommendations.Corporations - Finance ; Game theory

    Private Information and Bargaining Power in Venture Capital Financing

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    We model the natural evolution of private information over the life of a venture capitalist financed project. In the early stages, the entrepreneur is better informed regarding the project, and when the project matures, the venture capitalist has an informational advantage over the entrepreneur. Within this framework, we examine how the venture capitalist\u27s relative bargaining power affects cash flow rights and investment. When the bargaining advantage lies with the entrepreneur, the project may not be screened, and the venture capitalist may acquiesce to excessive initial investment but subsequently terminate the project. Increased venture capitalist bargaining power encourages project screening, attenuates the incentive to overinvest, and reduces the incidence of project termination subsequent to the initial investment. The payoff sensitivity of venture capitalist\u27s financing contract also increases as his bargaining power improves

    Price reactions to public announcements

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    We employ a parametric rational expectations equilibrium model to study the impact of public information releases on private information acquisition and asset prices in a large economy. We demonstrate that investors treat public information as a substitute for privately acquired information. Their attempts to substitute public for private information can amplify or even reverse the effect of public information releases on price volatility. The direction of the resulting change in price volatility is dependent on the level of public information regarding asset payoffs, the variance of asset payoffs, and the extent of supply shocks, implying that firms may differ in their optimal information release policies.Financial markets

    Emerging debt and equity markets: an exploratory investigation of integration using daily data

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    In this paper we examine integration between emerging and U.S. debt and equity markets. We first investigate price changes around significant "events," in this case changes in short-term U.S. interest rates brought about by actions of the Federal Reserve. Second, we estimate the predictability of returns using both domestic and U.S. variables. Finally, we test whether a single latent variable can explain these returns. The evidence suggests that the degree of integration varies with security types and the country of origin. However, these differences between security types become less apparent over time.Financial markets ; International finance

    Endothelin-1 as a neuropeptide: neurotransmitter or neurovascular effects?

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    Endothelin-1 (ET-1) is an endothelium-derived peptide that also possesses potent mitogenic activity. There is also a suggestion the ET-1 is a neuropeptide, based mainly on its histological identification in both the central and peripheral nervous system in a number of species, including man. A neuropeptide role for ET-1 is supported by studies showing a variety of effects caused following its administration into different regions of the brain and by application to peripheral nerves. In addition there are studies proposing that ET-1 is implicated in a number of neural circuits where its transmitter affects range from a role in pain and temperature control to its action on the hypothalamo-neurosecretory system. While the effect of ET-1 on nerve tissue is beyond doubt, its action on nerve blood flow is often ignored. Here, we review data generated in a number of species and using a variety of experimental models. Studies range from those showing the distribution of ET-1 and its receptors in nerve tissue to those describing numerous neurally-mediated effects of ET-1
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